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Executive summary
In 2010 Asia rebounded spectacularly from the 2008-09 global economic crisis, reinforcing its position as one of the world’s most economically dynamic regions. Nevertheless, for many countries 
in the region, infrastructure bottlenecks remain a major impediment to sustaining economic growth. 
Power shortages impinge upon the development of manufacturing and urban clusters; inadequate 
roads, seaports and airports hamper the movement of goods and labour; and poor water and sanitation 
systems pose a serious health risk to the region’s poor.  
As economic growth moderates in 2011, the sustainability of Asia’s recovery is in focus. Although 
economic stimulus packages have driven construction activity in countries such as China and Thailand, 
others have struggled to find funds for infrastructure building. In the region’s emerging economies, 
investment in infrastructure is essential for the development of the manufacturing and services sectors to 
enable countries to drive productivity and maintain long-term economic growth.
The shortfall in investment in infrastructure is widely recognised in the region, with many developing 
countries emphasising such investment as a priority within their national development plans. However, 
infrastructural development remains an expensive and complex undertaking, and the costs of continuous 
upkeep and improvement are high. Investment can be risky and constraints on public financing remain 
significant. 
In the face of such challenges, countries have consolidated strategies to capitalise on private-sector 
financing and expertise to build and operate infrastructure assets. Those that have developed robust and 
efficient institutions and processes for working with the private sector, such as the UK and Australia, have 
successfully used public-private partnerships to bridge the financing gap and drive infrastructure projects. 
Emerging markets have viewed such developments with interest, experimenting with various modes 
of private-sector engagement. Not all have been successful. Ongoing fiscal limitations, poor feasibility 
assessments and regulatory barriers have caused delays in the execution of projects, while concerns about 
financial viability, oversight and poor service delivery have arisen once contracts have been signed. 
While the private sector has emerged as a significant player in financing building and operating 
infrastructure assets across Asia, the potential of PPPs to drive much-needed investment and efficiency 
gains has not been fully realised in many countries. To ensure success, public-sector project planning and 
selection, as well as implementation capacity, need to be improved. At the same time, the private sector 
has a role to play in conducting due diligence and fostering competitive markets. 
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Developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Asia Infrascope is a benchmark index and learning 
tool that assesses countries’ readiness and capacity for sustainable, long-term PPP projects. The study 
scores aspects of the regulatory and institutional frameworks; project experience and success; the 
investment climate and the financial facilities in 11 developing countries in Asia-Pacific, four benchmark 
countries (Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea (South Korea), UK) and one state (Gujarat, India). The 
methodology is based on a similar study of Latin America and the Caribbean commissioned by the 
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF, a member of the Inter-American Development Bank Group) and 
published in 2009 and 2010. The Infrascope scores aspects of the legal and regulatory framework and the 
investment environment for PPP infrastructure projects in each country, and involves in-depth industry 
analysis, interviews with country and regional field experts and secondary research.
Evaluating the environment for public-private partnerships in 
Asia-Pacific
A growing body of international evidence points to the importance of a favourable regulatory environment 
and robust institutional framework in developing sustainable and efficient PPP infrastructure projects. A 
country’s public-sector capacity and implementation experience also have a bearing on viability, as does 
the investment climate and availability of financial instruments for long-term financing. 
Service contracts
Delegation of risk to private sector, level of commitment required
Source:  Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Economist Intelligence Unit.
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1 See Infrascope Background 
and Methodology for full 
definition.
By transferring responsibility for service provision to the private sector, PPPs are a means of improving 
allocation of risk and investment efficiency, while ensuring public-sector accountability for essential 
services. The Infrascope seeks to examine a country’s readiness to undertake long-term PPPs in an 
efficient and sustainable manner. Accordingly, we have utilised a definition of “PPP” that focuses on 
longer-term contracts, where the PPP arrangement reflects a significant transfer of operational and 
commercial risk to the private sector. 
The study refers to long-term contracts between a public-sector body and a private-sector entity for 
the design, construction operation and maintenance of public infrastructure. Finance is usually provided 
by, and significant construction, operation and maintenance risks transferred to, the private-sector 
entity. The public-sector body remains responsible for policy oversight and regulation, with complete 
control generally reverting to them at the end of the contract term.1 It is notable that there is robust 
activity in much of Asia for shorter-term leases and management or service contracts for infrastructure 
assets. While the Infrascope does not focus on such arrangements, it can be assumed that good capacity 
and preparedness for concessions and Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangements translates to some 
degree of “readiness” for the award and management of such contracts. Consideration of the full 
privatisation of assets—divestiture or Build-Operate-Own (BOO) of infrastructure assets to private-sector 
parties or government-affiliated enterprises—is outside the remit of the study, although it is a model that 
has been utilised in some countries across the region to promote infrastructural development.  
An interactive learning tool 
The Asia Infrascope features the Economist Intelligence Unit’s independent evaluation of each country 
as of June 2011, but also allows users to score indicators and re-weight categories. The index is not 
designed as an investment tool for private-sector financiers (as the data and indicators are largely 
qualitative and sectors have been aggregated). However, it provides a valuable starting point for a 
dialogue among policy makers on improving the enabling environment for infrastructure PPPs, through 
the benchmarking and comparison of key aspects across countries including the investment climate and 
legal and regulatory environment. A comprehensive assessment of laws and regulations is available in 
the index, which is available free of charge as an Excel tool at ww.eiu. com/sponsor/Asiainfrascope. The 
Infrascope’s standardised structure enhances transparency, deepening and broadening stakeholder 
knowledge of PPPs. PPPs are used in a wide variety of sectors beyond transport, water/sanitation and 
energy generation, but we have concentrated on these sectors due to data-availability constraints and 
the need to maintain a tight analytical focus. To ensure global comparability, the framework used for the 
Latin America and Caribbean Infrascope has been applied to the Asia-Pacific region, with adjustments 
made to capture distinctive features of the legal environment and practices within the region.  
The inclusion of Gujarat acknowledges the development of distinctive PPP ecosystems at the sub-
national level in some of the world’s larger countries. In India’s federated structure, Gujarat has 
developed its own systems and a rich body of experience in implementing infrastructure PPPs. This pilot 
study of a state (as opposed to a nation) attempts to assess the capacity and preparedness of a significant 
sub-national entity independent of national assessment. Instead of a sub-national adjustment score, a 
proxy for the India national score has been applied to control for national-level factors that may constrain 
Evaluating the environment for public-private partnerships in Asia-Pacific
The 2011 Infrascope
6 7
or facilitate the effectiveness of PPPs at the local level, and to ensure consistency with the national-level 
evaluations. 
An Excel interactive learning tool has been developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit, which 
allows users to; analyse, compare and visualise country information; reweight categories; and self-score 
indicators. It is available to download for free of charge at www.eiu.com/sponsor/Asiainfrascope.
“PPP-readiness” in Asia-Pacific
The results of the assessment suggest that countries can be grouped into four categories which categorise 
the environment for sustainable, long-term PPPs: mature, developed, emerging and nascent (see Figure 
2). Overall scores and category scores are available in the interactive Excel learning tool, which enables 
users to conduct “what if” analysis, and better understand how a country can improve its enabling 
environment. A country’s overall score comprises of weighted category scores of its: regulatory and 
institutional framework, operational maturity, investment climate, financial facilities, and sub-national 
adjustment.
Figure 2
2011 Asia Infrascope and 2010 Latin America and Caribbean Infrascope, overview
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
Score range
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Australia, the region’s most developed economy and a world leader in PPP practice, tops the 2011 
index, scoring 92.3 points out of 100, owing to strong regulatory, institutional and investment 
conditions. Meanwhile, the country’s state-level success with high-profile initiatives such as Partnerships 
Victoria bolstered its sub-national adjustment score. The second-ranked country, the UK, demonstrated 
similar strengths, along with strong institutional capacity and sound implementation practices, scoring 
a total of 89.7 points. This solid performance is unsurprising, given the UK’s Private Finance Initiatives 
(PFIs). Both Australia and the UK can be classified as “mature” PPP markets, with substantial levels 
of PPP activity under their belts and sophisticated frameworks and capacity in place for planning and 
implementing complex projects. 
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Republic of Korea, India, and Japan are the top-performing Asia- Pacific countries in 2011 Infrascope, 
with scores of 71.3, 64.8, and 63.7, respectively. They sit more comfortably with the cluster of countries 
in the 2010 Infrascope for Latin America and the Caribbean that could be classified as “developed”—all 
boasting a decent institutional and regulatory framework, but lacking the sophistication of the “mature” 
markets of Australia and the UK in addressing some of the more nuanced challenges brought about by PPPs. 
Republic of Korea (71.3) takes third place on the index by virtue of its solid regulatory and institutional 
framework, and robust financial facilities for infrastructure funding. As a sub-national entity operating 
under India’s regulatory and institutional central framework, Gujarat’s state-level PPP regulations and its 
strong investment environment drive an overall score of 67.6, putting it in fourth place. 
Japan and India achieve overall scores which are very close—perhaps surprising initially, given the 
former’s deep and sophisticated financing facilities and the latter’s reputation for bureaucratic and 
regulatory hold-ups. Japan (63.7) has decent fundamentals for a strong PPP market, but has yet to fully 
embrace the PPP concept in practice. However, Japan is currently reforming its PPP laws; should it begin 
to deliver on larger-scale projects its index performance could improve significantly in coming years. 
PPP development in India (64.8) has been driven by strong political will and advances in public capacity 
and processes. However, lingering problems with the cohesiveness of regulations and the consistency of 
interactions between central government and the states are systemic, and will only be addressed over time. 
An intense period of infrastructural development over the past decade placed China, scoring an 
overall 49.8 points, at the top of the pack in terms of operational maturity—a category of the index that 
examines a country’s experience with past projects. According to the World Bank Private Participation 
in Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) database, a staggering 614 projects in electricity, water and 
transport infrastructure reached financial closure in 2000-09 in China, in spite of an underdeveloped 
institutional framework and regulatory environment. The will and capacity to execute such projects at 
the sub-national level is strong, particularly in key cities and provinces such as Beijing, Shanghai and 
Zhejiang. 
Other “emerging” PPP countries have experienced mixed success in the development and execution 
of projects, and have recently taken concerted action to improve aspects of the operating environment 
or to boost institutional capacity. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Kazakhstan have undergone significant 
regulatory reform, with the ratification of new PPP acts, while at the same time developing institutional 
frameworks from the ground up. More experienced countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, have updated, or are in the process of updating, regulations and have restructured existing 
institutional frameworks in the hope of improving the processes around PPP selection and oversight, and 
to develop specialist capacity in the public sector.  
Vietnam, Mongolia and Papua New Guinea occupy the lower end of the index, with scores below 30 
out of a possible 100. This is in part a function of limited country experience with PPPs—Vietnam has 
only recently developed pilot legislation allowing PPPs between private- and public-sector entities, 
although the country has had some experience in engaging private-sector parties in the development 
of power facilities. Meanwhile, Mongolia and Papua New Guinea registered no PPP projects that reached 
financial closure in 2000-09 according to the World Bank PPIAF database. Regulatory frameworks and 
institutional arrangements are not yet robust, although decent levels of political will towards deploying 
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PPPs as a means of boosting much-needed infrastructure investment in the three countries are notable. 
In Asia-Pacific, there are no countries resisting the incorporation of private investment in infrastructure, 
with generally positive attitudes towards the concept of private-sector participation in infrastructural 
development. This is in contrast to Latin America and the Caribbean, which saw the three countries at the 
bottom end of the 2010 LAC Infrascope index (Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador) actively dismantle the 
institutional capacity needed to execute and oversee projects. 
Regional trends 
The story in Asia-Pacific today is one of optimism regarding the capacity of private-sector participation to 
drive much-needed infrastructural development. This is reflected in high levels of government willingness 
to improve the regulatory environment and establish the necessary institutions to develop and manage 
infrastructure PPP projects. In the past few years, regulatory change has swept across the region, 
resulting in the majority of countries updating existing policy frameworks or establishing new PPP Acts in 
law (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mongolia and Vietnam), with a number of significant reform initiatives under 
consideration (Japan, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Kazakhstan and the Philippines). Improvements 
have focused in particular on the bidding process, with the aim of developing competitive markets for 
procurement. 
Reforms have been accompanied by efforts to improve institutional frameworks, boost project 
expertise in the public sector and to define the roles and responsibilities for public-sector entities in 
PPP oversight and planning. New PPP-dedicated units have been established, or are pending, in Japan, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea, while restructuring of 
the PPP agencies has taken place in Indonesia and the Philippines. Thailand and Vietnam have recently 
launched inter-ministry taskforces to develop the PPP agenda, and India has the ministerial-level 
Committee on Infrastructure, with both the Planning Commission and the Department of Economic 
Affairs supporting development and execution of projects. China is distinctive in lacking of PPP-specific 
institutions, with such projects handled in a similar fashion to state infrastructure projects. 
Well-designed regulatory and institutional frameworks are necessary conditions for most markets, but 
for all the efforts around regulatory reform and institutional change that have been invested to date, it is 
the capacity of the public sector to react systematically to the complexities associated with infrastructure 
PPPs that will ensure long-term success. The appropriate allocation of risk, efficient dispute-resolution 
mechanisms, strong project-finance structuring skills and the robust negotiation of contracts are 
critical to good project execution, as is effective public-sector oversight. The nascent and emerging PPP 
markets in the region have yet to develop the institutional capacity and expertise required to bring these 
frameworks to life. The proof is in the implementation. 
Yet, despite  weak regulatory frameworks and underdeveloped institutions, China has seen an 
unprecedented level of PPP infrastructure activity in the past decade, driven by a strong investment 
climate and the sheer scale of the opportunity. The lure of a sizable market and a  reasonable operating 
environment has also resulted in significant levels of private-sector infrastructure investment in other 
large countries such as the Philippines and Thailand despite the “emerging” state of their PPP readiness. 
Such projects come with no guarantee of sustainability, as exemplified by evidence of disputes and 
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distress. Still, the attractiveness of the country’s investment proposition is critical, as is the imperative 
to get the rules and the institutions right. Prospects for Asia-Pacific as a region are bright, given the 
increasing attractiveness of its business environment and the growth of increasingly sophisticated 
domestic financial facilities. However, weak government effectiveness in implementing policy and a 
tendency towards political distortion in the private sector remain a threat to fostering sustainable and 
efficient PPP infrastructure projects in the region. 
Infrascope background and methodology
In this study, “PPP” refers specifically to projects that involve a long-term contract between a public-
sector body and a private-sector entity for the design, construction (or upgrading), operation and 
maintenance of public infrastructure. Finance is usually provided by, and significant construction, 
operation and maintenance risks are transferred to, the private-sector entity, which also bears either 
availability or demand risk. However, the public-sector body remains responsible for policy oversight and 
regulation; and the infrastructure generally reverts to public-sector control at the end of the contract 
term. 
The themes identified in the Infrascope, as well as the sector focus, were developed in collaboration 
with a group of regional and sector experts. This group was composed of country specialists and 
stakeholders (policymakers, lawyers, consultants and development bank staff), as well as regional and 
international PPP experts. The group validated the choice of sectors and category weightings were also 
agreed on. The Economist Intelligence Unit worked with independent regional and country experts to 
make region-specific adjustments to indicators, allowing for the consideration of various features specific 
to the business environment in Asia-Pacific, including the prevalence of single-source and unsolicited 
bids, and the presence of common law legal systems.  
The categories that make up the overall index pinpoint crucial aspects of the PPP value chain, starting at 
project-conception and spanning contract-design, enforcement, supervision, termination and financing. 
Specifically, the index evaluates readiness and capacity by dividing the PPP project life-cycle into five 
components: 1) a country’s legal and regulatory framework for concession projects; 2) the design and 
responsibilities of institutions that prepare, award and oversee projects (institutional framework); 
3) the government’s ability to uphold laws and regulations for concessions, as well as the number and 
success rate of past projects (operational maturity); 4) the business, political and social environment for 
investment (investment climate), and 5) the financial facilities for funding infrastructure. In addition, 
to recognise the significance of activity occurring at the regional level, an additional, stand-alone sixth 
category and indicator for sub-national PPPs was added in 2010 (sub-national adjustment factor).
Several of the indicators that compose the index are based on quantitative data; these have been 
drawn from international statistical sources. The others are qualitative in nature and have been produced 
by our team. Many of these focus on legal and regulatory factors and are informed by publicly available 
information and interviews with sector and country experts. In the absence of data, the Infrascope uses 
qualitative measures that capture some elements of these important factors.
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Scoring criteria
The Infrascope index comprises 19 indicators, of which 15 are qualitative and four quantitative. Data for the quantitative indicators are drawn from the World Bank and the Private Participation 
in Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) data base and from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Risk 
Briefing service. Gaps in the quantitative data have been filled by estimates.
The scoring of qualitative indicators  was informed by a range of primary sources (legal texts, 
government web sites, press reports and interviews), secondary reports and data sources adjusted by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit. The main sources used in the index are the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
the World Bank and Transparency International.
The categories and their associated indicators are as follows:
1. Legal and regulatory framework (weighted 25%)
1.1 Consistency and quality of PPP regulations
1.2 Effective PPP selection and decision-making
1.3 Fairness/openness of bids, contract changes
1.4 Dispute-resolution mechanisms
2. Institutional framework (weighted 20%)
2.1 Quality of institutional design
2.2 PPP contract, hold-up and expropriation risk
3. Operational maturity (weighted 15%)
3.1 Public capacity to plan and oversee PPPs
3.2 Methods and criteria for awarding projects
3.3 Regulators’ risk-allocation record
3.4 Experience in electricity, transport and water concessions
3.5 Quality of electricity, transport and water concessions
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4. Investment climate (weighted 15%)
4.1 Political distortion
4.2 Business environment
4.3 Political will 
5.  Financial facilities (weighted 15%)
5.1 Government payment risk 
5.2 Capital market: private infrastructure finance
5.3 Marketable debt
5.4 Government support for low-income users
6.  Sub-national adjustment factor (weighted 10%)
6.1 Sub-national adjustment
A detailed explanation of each indicator and scoring method is given in Appendix 2.
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Index results
Overall scores 
The overall results of the 2011 Asia Infrascope show country rankings as based on the weighted sum of the six category scores. The index scores countries on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents 
the ideal environment for PPP projects. A breakdown of overall rankings by individual indicator can 
be seen in the Excel interactive learning tool, which is available via free download at www.eiu.com/
sponsor/Asiainfrascope.
 1 Australia 92.3
2 UK 89.7
3 Korea, Rep. 71.3
4 Gujarat State 67.6
5 India 64.8
6 Japan 63.7
7 China 49.8
8 Philippines 47.1
9 Indonesia 46.1
10 Thailand 45.3
11 Bangladesh 39.2
12 Pakistan 38.8
13 Kazakhstan 34.3
14 Vietnam 26.3
15 Mongolia 23.3
16 Papua New Guinea 20.8
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Category scores
1. Legal and regulatory framework 
Out of the 15 countries and the single state in this study, the top-ranked, Australia, 
the UK, and the Republic of Korea, also scored 
highest in this category, with cohesive national 
frameworks in place. Notably, only the Republic 
of Korea has a dedicated PPP Act. Open and 
competitive bidding is a requirement in these 
countries, with economic value, rather than 
just lowest cost, a leading factor. In particular, 
these countries distinguish themselves by the 
use of sophisticated mechanisms for proposal 
evaluation and project selection. 
India has strong systems in place for PPP 
project-selection and bidding, but suffers from a 
degree of incoherence in practice between state 
and national frameworks. Gujarat State, under the 
umbrella of the national framework, has developed 
its own PPP act, providing a coherent state-level framework for PPP development.  
Regulatory reform has swept across the region in recent years, with several countries instituting new 
acts, updating frameworks, or currently considering amendments. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Mongolia 
and Vietnam have recently instituted new PPP regulations, while the Republic of Korea and Indonesia 
have updated PPP laws in the past few years. Japan, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Kazakhstan and the 
Philippines have recognised the need to update their frameworks and are currently pushing revisions 
through their respective legislatures, with the aim of improving the effectiveness and clarity of the 
legislation and regulation for PPP infrastructure. There are currently no tangible initiatives to reform 
regulations in China and India, despite the former’s fairly weak regulatory set-up, and a lack of cohesion 
within the latter’s existing framework. 
1 Australia 100.0
2 UK 96.9
3 Korea, Rep. 78.1
4 Gujarat State 65.6
5 India 59.4
6 Japan 50.0
7 Philippines 43.8
=8 Bangladesh 40.6
=8 Indonesia 40.6
10 Pakistan 34.4
11 China 31.3
12 Thailand 28.1
=13 Kazakhstan 25.0
=13 Mongolia 25.0
15 Vietnam 18.8
16 Papua New Guinea 15.6
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There are a number of challenges associated with dispute-resolution in the courts that are more 
pronounced in the developing economies—delays, concerns over judicial independence and issues of 
capacity related to complex, technical cases. These lead to a wide range of mechanisms being deployed. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms, including conciliation, renegotiation and arbitration, 
are used in nearly all countries, although there are barriers to the use of arbitration for PPP contracts in 
countries such as Vietnam and Thailand.
2. Institutional framework
The top three countries in the overall 
index—Australia, the UK and the Republic of 
Korea—also have the best scores for institutional 
framework, in part owing to the provision for 
checks and balances in project-implementation 
and monitoring. All have good institutions and 
processes for project-preparation and approval, 
and there is strong oversight by regulators to 
ensure compliance. Australia and the UK move 
ahead by virtue of their sound mechanisms in the 
case of compensation for early termination, and of 
efficient replacement of failed operators. 
Across the majority of countries in the study, 
there have been concerted efforts to bolster the 
institutional framework, and ensure that there are 
clearly defined roles for public-sector agencies to 
enable PPP oversight and planning. New PPP-
dedicated units have been, or are in the process of being, established in Japan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea. The Philippines has recently relocated its PPP 
unit, while Indonesia is currently developing a new entity within its development agency. Thailand and 
Vietnam have recently launched inter-ministry taskforces to develop the PPP agenda, and India has the 
powerful ministerial-level Committee on Infrastructure, with both the Planning Commission and PPP 
Unit of the Department of Economic Affairs supporting development and execution of projects. China is 
distinctive in its lack of PPP-specific institutions, with such projects handled in a similar fashion to state 
infrastructure projects.
Risk of hold-up is an area of some concern across the region with respect to judicial enforcement. 
Lengthy proceedings and bureaucratic hold-ups are fairly common, notably in the South Asian countries, 
although expropriation risk is not a serious concern in the region.
=1 Australia 100.0
=1 UK 100.0
3 Korea, Rep. 75.0
=4 India 66.7
=4 Japan 66.7
=4 Gujarat State 66.7
7 Thailand 50.0
=8 Indonesia 41.7
=8 Kazakhstan 41.7
=8 Philippines 41.7
=11 Bangladesh 33.3
=11 Pakistan 33.3
=13 China 25.0
=13 Mongolia 25.0
=13 Papua New Guinea 25.0
16 Vietnam 16.7
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3. Operational maturity
In spite of its underdeveloped regulatory and 
institutional frameworks for PPPs, China has 
accrued a phenomenal wealth of PPP experience 
in the past decade or so, registering 614 projects 
in water, electricity and transportation reaching 
financial closure in 2000-09, according to the 
World Bank PPIAF database.2 Driven by high rates 
of economic growth and ambitious government 
plans for infrastructural development, the 
country’s pool of project experience is unmatched 
globally. China gains top marks in this category 
as a result, although institutional development 
lags significantly behind project roll out. India is 
next, with a respectable 261 projects, followed by 
the Republic of Korea with 78 registered projects, 
consolidating a high degree of PPP activity in the 
region. Eleven of the countries in this study have 
had at least 20 concessions projects in the past ten years. At the other end of the spectrum, Mongolia and 
Papua New Guinea had no registered concessions in 2000-09, with only two for Kazakhstan.3  
Generally, countries with good capacity levels also have better methods and practices for awarding 
projects, as exemplified by the UK and Australia—despite the relatively smaller size of the PPP markets 
compared with larger countries, the skilled labour pool is sufficient, with high levels of the requisite 
technical and financial expertise. Following on from a high number of projects conducted in the last 
decade, several countries have accumulated decent levels of specialist expertise for project-planning, 
design and financing in the public sector, notably India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and 
Gujarat State. In improving their institutional frameworks, many other countries have paid due attention 
to developing public capacity, often with the financial and technical support of multilateral institutions 
and donor governments and the development of public-sector expertise has been a common ambition for 
many of the middle-income and developing countries in the index.
1 China 78.1
2 UK 76.7
3 India 70.0
4 Korea, Rep. 68.8
5 Australia 66.5
6 Japan 61.4
7 Gujarat State 61.1
8 Thailand 50.9
9 Indonesia 47.9
10 Philippines 44.8
11 Pakistan 41.8
12 Bangladesh 41.0
13 Vietnam 25.5
14 Kazakhstan 15.7
15 Papua New Guinea 6.3
16 Mongolia 3.1
2 Figures do not include 
management contracts, leases 
or divestitures. Numbers do 
not necessarily match other 
explanations in the index, 
owing to different counting 
methods and timeframes. 
Where countries were not 
featured in the World Bank 
PPIAF database, we drew on 
credible alternative sources.
3 Analysis and figures 
for project-cancellation 
and distress are based on 
information taken from the 
World Bank PPIAF database. 
In-country research and 
anecdotal evidence suggest 
that the project distress rate 
could be significantly higher 
in practice. 
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4. Investment climate
The recent history of regulatory and institutional 
reform in the region is a reflection of favourable 
government attitudes towards PPPs, with Gujarat 
State scoring particularly highly in this category, 
along with Australia and the UK. Countries have 
openly welcomed the concept of private-sector 
engagement in infrastructure, with the majority 
demonstrating political consensus around the 
need to engage with the private sector and provide 
favourable frameworks, although implementation 
can be slow. Only in Papua New Guinea are 
there concerns of political opposition to the 
development of the PPP agenda. Asia-Pacific as 
a whole compares favourably to Latin America, 
where conditions for private investment are hostile 
in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador, the three 
countries at the bottom of the 2010 index.  
As a general rule, Asia’s large, fast-growing economies also benefit from a thriving business 
environment and attractive market opportunities, although political distortion affecting the private 
sector and the effectiveness of policy-implementation remain concerns in the region. 
5. Financial facilities
Project financing is readily available for the 
developed countries in the index; Australia, 
the UK, the Republic of Korea and Japan all 
benefit from deep and liquid markets for private 
infrastructure financing and marketable debt with 
long-term maturities. Major domestic and foreign 
banks compete to provide financing for projects, 
providing conventional financing and other 
options, while all four countries have sophisticated 
domestic debt markets. India and China both have 
domestic medium-term debt markets for both 
private- and public-sector issuers, although depth 
remains an issue. 
India and China’s markets for private 
infrastructure finance have evolved quickly in 
recent years. While India (and by extension 
1 Australia 87.4
2 UK 82.3
3 Gujarat State 80.0
4 Japan 57.5
5 Korea, Rep. 54.2
6 India 52.3
7 China 51.6
8 Indonesia 50.3
9 Thailand 48.6
10 Bangladesh 47.3
11 Mongolia 46.9
12 Vietnam 46.4
13 Philippines 46.3
14 Kazakhstan 43.3
15 Pakistan 43.0
16 Papua New Guinea 17.7
=1 Australia 94.4
=1 UK 94.4
3 Korea, Rep. 88.9
4 Japan 83.3
5 Gujarat State 77.8
6 India 72.2
7 China 66.7
8 Philippines 61.1
=9 Kazakhstan 55.6
=9 Thailand 55.6
11 Indonesia 52.8
12 Bangladesh 44.4
=13 Pakistan 38.9
=13 Papua New Guinea 38.9
15 Vietnam 33.3
16 Mongolia 13.9
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Gujarat) is developing new domestic initiatives to promote the flow of private funds to infrastructure, 
most notably in private equity, the markets are not yet deep, despite home-grown instruments 
developing in size and complexity. China, however, is still reliant on offshore lending from Singapore 
and Hong Kong for private financing, with finance deals for large projects requiring State Council 
approval. There are some, albeit less forthcoming, sources of private finance available in Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, the Philippines and Thailand, with fewer domestic instruments. Exchange- and interest-
rate hedging instruments are generally available, although many countries that are currently active 
in PPPs still depend on foreign funds and currencies to finance projects. Most countries do have debt 
markets with medium-term maturities issued by the government, although these are limited and depth 
remains an issue. 
Government payment risk is evenly spread across the countries in the index, with Australia and the 
UK most likely to fulfil obligations to investors and offer guarantees. At the other end of the scale, high 
levels of sovereign debt risk increase the government payment risk on infrastructure PPPs for Mongolia, 
Pakistan and Vietnam. 
The culture of government support for low-income users to improve access to services and drive 
demand is not particularly strong in the region, with most countries issuing subsidies for improved access 
in water, transport or electricity to low-income users only infrequently and usually through indirect 
means. Price distortions through subsidies on petrol, electricity, and, in some cases water, have been 
problematic in several countries featured in the index, particularly in the context of rising commodity 
prices. Artificially low prices as a result of government subsidies and pricing policies are having a 
distorting effect in some markets, such as Vietnam, Mongolia and Bangladesh. 
6. Sub-national adjustment
Asia’s largest economies have developed a decent 
set of frameworks for sub-national level PPPs, with 
good implementation-capacity and institutional 
design emerging at the state level in particular. Of 
the 15 countries in this study, all are empowered 
to develop infrastructure assets through PPP at 
a sub-national level, although the majority lack 
technical capacity or will, preventing them from 
seriously pursuing projects at this level. Around 
90% of Australia’s PPPs are administered at the 
state level, resulting in an important and diverse 
sub-national programme. The UK boasts a strong 
sub-national scheme, although capacity does vary 
by municipality. Japan has a robust municipal-
level programme, but large projects remain within 
the purview of the central government.  
India’s states are generally active in PPPs and 
1 Australia 100.0
=2 China 75.0
=2 India 75.0
=2 Japan 75.0
=2 UK 75.0
=6 Indonesia 50.0
=6 Pakistan 50.0
=6 Philippines 50.0
=6 Korea, Rep. 50.0
=6 Thailand 50.0
=6 Gujarat State 50.0
=12 Bangladesh 25.0
=12 Kazakhstan 25.0
=12 Mongolia 25.0
=12 Papua New Guinea 25.0
=12 Vietnam 25.0
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many have their own PPP laws and regulations (although these cannot override the national regulations). 
The biggest constraint at a sub-national level is the heterogeneity caused by the variation among state 
frameworks and institutional set-ups, which creates a maze of regulatory detail. Gujarat emerges as one 
of the top destinations in India for PPP projects, developing its own set of specific laws and institutions 
within the boundaries of the framework established by the central government. China also has a 
provincial- and city-driven PPP programme operating under national regulation, but public capacity 
varies significantly across the states and cities.  
For other countries, sub-national capacity is fairly weak, and there is limited project activity, with many 
choosing to focus on the development of national-level frameworks and projects.
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Appendix 1: Country comments
This section spotlights the performance of individual countries in the index. For full, individual country 
profiles and indicator scores, please refer to the underlying index and “country profile” tab, available at 
www.eiu.com/sponsor/AsiaInfrascope.
Australia
A world leader in PPP initiatives, Australia has well-established rules and practices at all stages of 
the process. 
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 92.3 100 100 66.5 87.4 94.4 100
Rank 1 1 =1 5 1 =1 1
Australia has an impressive record on infrastructure PPP projects. There is no specific legal framework, 
but a variety of laws and policies cover government procurement, including the Financial Management 
and Accountability Act (1997). In practice, this regime provides for very clear project-selection, risk-
management, oversight, and compensation. Projects have been undertaken in a wide range of social 
and economic infrastructure services, although few PPPs occur in the energy sector. Around 90% of 
projects are administered at a local level by the departments of infrastructure, finance and treasury; 
the Department of Infrastructure and Transport’s Major Infrastructure Projects Office oversees those 
undertaken at a federal level. Any government contract with a value of over A$50m (US$54.2m) must be 
considered for delivery as a PPP.
Before projects can be offered, however, it must be demonstrated that a PPP would provide superior 
outcomes to all other forms of procurement, and also offer better value, that a Public Sector Comparator, 
which estimates the whole-life cost of a project if delivered entirely by government. A Public Interest Test 
is also applied, to evaluate the indirect effect of the project on aspects such as privacy and security.
Bidding is transparent and fair, and the government’s policy requires a competitive process, Dispute-
resolution is handled through expert evaluation or arbitration, in order to avoid expensive and time-
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consuming legal disputes. When the courts do become involved, judges appear to deal with matters 
in an impartial and expert fashion. Project failure, however, is rare, with only two contracts having 
been returned to state management. A range of institutions ensure compliance with the PPP process, 
including the Department of Finance and Administration’s Australian Public-Private Partnerships Unit, 
which provides advice to, and evaluates proposals for, government agencies. These bodies also provide 
adequate guidance on risk-transfer, which has improved greatly from the old position of attempting to put 
the greatest amount of risk on the shoulders of the private partner. Projects such as the Gateway Tunnel 
in Sydney, which has disappointed in a commercial sense, nevertheless included appropriate risk-transfer 
management. Politically, all major parties support PPP projects, and the strong state of the public 
finances, and depth of capital markets, mean that stability and the ability to gain project finance are both 
robust. Foreign banks, as well as the Australian “Big Four”, compete to provide such financing, for periods 
of up to 17 years.
Bangladesh
A new regulatory framework and new institutions suggest improvements to come for the PPP 
environment in Bangladesh. Despite the government’s obvious enthusiasm, however, problems 
remain.
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 39.2 40.6 33.3 41.0 47.3 44.4 25.0
Rank 11 =8 =11 12 10 12 =12
Bangladesh has had experience of PPP projects since the 1990s, but overhauled its system in 2010, 
with the introduction of a new framework under the Policy and Strategy for Public-Private Partnerships 
(PSPPP). The PSPPP provides for a competitive bidding process and oversight, although it remains 
ambiguous on the question of risk-allocation and compensation. Currently, there is no specific PPP Act 
in place. The Central Procurement Technical Office monitors and oversees the procurement process, 
while the process from project-identification to award is the responsibility of the relevant line ministry 
commissioning the project. To date, the bidding process has suffered from a lack of transparency, 
although improvements were made in 2010 (for instance, the introduction of the “Swiss Challenge” 
method for unsolicited bids which allows for third parties to match or exceed the offer made by the 
original proponent). The judicial process is also problematic, with a lack of capacity to deal with cases, 
poor knowledge, and lengthy settlement periods holding up proceedings. 
Currently, a PPP Office within the Prime Minister’s Office is being developed, in order to support 
relevant ministries in their project-selection and oversight, while a PPP unit (under the Ministry of 
Finance) is to be developed in order to issue guidelines. As this system is still evolving, there is a general 
lack of expertise on technical issues, although bodies like the government-owned Infrastructural 
development Company Ltd (IDCOL) do have some relevant experience. Matters are likely to improve 
owing to the government’s mandate and strong political will to promote PPPs, although, as with many 
developing countries, bureaucracy and inefficiency are concerns. Large-scale infrastructure projects 
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also face challenges in attracting financing, owing to a lack of projects that actually meet the funding 
standards of the IDCOL, which exists to provide long-term senior and subordinated debt to relevant 
projects under certain criteria. Outside of the IDCOL, there are limited options, owing to Bangladesh’s 
relatively small and underdeveloped debt markets.
China
Continued strong growth and great infrastructural requirements create an environment of 
opportunity. A lack of clear rules and transparency presents significant challenges to development. 
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 49.8 31.3 25.0 78.1 51.6 66.7 75.0
Rank 7 11 =13 1 7 7 =2
China has a wealth of experience with PPPs, going back to the 1990s. Nevertheless, the legal 
environment is not strong, and the majority of projects involve State-Owned Enterprises (SOE), rather 
than genuinely private concerns. Bureaucracy and regulation at all levels, along with a lack of provision 
for risk-allocation or compensation in China’s PPP rules, add to the difficulty. The Ministry of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Development has issued contract samples that strongly reinforce the importance of 
performance bonds at all stages, although this has not had much impact on the number of disputes 
during the concession period, which remains high. It is difficult to determine whether PPPs are selected 
based on value for money (VFM), as information related to appraisal and project details is not typically 
available. 
China has no specific national-level PPP agency, with projects being treated in the same way as 
traditional state infrastructure projects. The State Council and its ministries approve PPP projects, and 
then oversee their management. Generally, the government is keen on greater use of PPP projects owing 
to the country’s massive infrastructural requirements, which local governments are not always able 
to meet. There is also a vast difference between the capacity of large localities, like Beijing, Zhejiang, 
or Shanghai, to handle PPP projects, and that of more rural jurisdictions. Financing typically comes 
from offshore sources, in the form of syndicated loans or project finance deals through Hong Kong or 
Singapore.
India
A high level of interest and experience with PPP projects, as well as the maturing of processes and 
the institutional framework, belie a lack of regulatory clarity. 
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 64.8 59.4 66.7 70.0 52.3 72.2 75.0
Rank 5 5 =4 3 6 6 =2
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PPP projects have a deep history in India, with a high level of overall acceptance and use of the model. 
There is no PPP act at a federal level, leading to a certain amount of disconnect and regional variation 
(some states have their own PPP policies or acts); however, in recent years, several national bodies 
have begun to be seen as components of the institutional structure for PPPs, such as the Committee 
on Infrastructure (chaired by the prime minister); the Planning Commission; and the PPP Unit of the 
Department of Economic Affairs. Following a Supreme Court ruling in 2009, the awarding of projects has 
been subject to the meeting of requirements on transparency and competition. Strategic planning, pre-
feasibility analysis, financial viability, PPP suitability, and “readiness” must all be demonstrated, leading 
to a process that is seen as largely fair and predictable, albeit time-consuming. Dispute-resolution 
takes place through either “amicable settlement” or arbitration; foreign bidders may also make use of 
international arbitration. 
Government agencies have a relatively high level of proficiency in PPP projects, particularly with 
regard to monitoring of construction. Assistance from multilateral agencies has also helped, although 
there is a certain skill shortage in the oversight of operation and management. While there is still the 
lack of a properly evolved framework, risk-allocation has been improving since the introduction of 
Model Concession Agreements in 2004. The fact that states are gaining in power muddies the water, as 
outlooks, laws, and even the willingness of administrations to adhere to those laws vary by area. In terms 
of finance, matters have improved, with a variety of initiatives (such as the creation of the Viability Gap 
Fund, and the India Infrastructure Finance Company Ltd) enabling greater participation of private finance 
in infrastructure. Foreign financial institutions and multilateral agencies can issue bonds in rupees, and 
private equity participation is also increasing—US$4bn was invested in 2010, up from US$1bn four years 
previously. 
Indonesia
Despite recent improvements, there is still a lack of cohesion on PPP regulation and the institutional 
structure. Long-term financing options are still limited. 
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 46.1 40.6 41.7 47.9 50.3 52.8 50.0
Rank 9 =8 =8 9 8 11 =6
With some experience in infrastructure PPPs under its belt, particularly in electricity, Indonesia has 
recently made efforts to improve the clarity of the regulatory environment and bolster its institutional 
capacity. The framework for PPP projects in Indonesia is technically provided by Presidential Regulation 
No. 67/2005 (2005), although other general regulations and sector-specific laws also cover their 
development and implementation. A revision (2010) was introduced to cover risk-allocation, and 
competitive tendering, as well as fiscal and non-fiscal support. While improved, there is still a lack of 
cohesion. The agency that signs the PPP contract is responsible for monitoring it and ensuring value for 
money, but to date this has not been carried out particularly well. Selection and decision-making are not 
robust, as there is no standardised or legally binding system in place. 
22 23
Evaluating the environment for public-private partnerships in Asia-Pacific
The 2011 Infrascope
The National Development and Planning Agency (Bappenas) is currently acting as the PPP unit, while 
its PPP-dedicated P3CU Unit is still being established. Once properly operational, P3CU will promote 
methods of screening and prioritising projects. There is technically a division of responsibilities between 
the Investment Coordination Board, the Ministry of Finance, and Bappenas, in terms of transactions, 
government support, and project preparation, respectively, but there is no proper framework governing 
this. There are no strict rules governing unsolicited projects, which tend to be procured in an apparently 
idiosyncratic way. There is a lack of documented procedures regarding the bidding process, although it is 
hoped that the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) procedures for the Central Java Power Project 
will offer a template for the future.
Disputes are resolved on a non-standardised, case-by-case basis, as outlined in the PPP agreement 
included in the project contract. Projects require technical conciliation schemes, as well as guarantee 
agreements, to be written into their PPP agreements in order to be eligible for government guarantee. 
Contracts themselves are not prepared in a standardised way, and this has led to renegotiations, 
particularly in the water sector, with the two existing Jakarta water concessions having experienced 
contract-related problems. Also, although improvements have been made (such as the establishment 
of the Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee Fund in 2009), risk-allocation in Indonesia is still weak. This 
means that there are a limited number of financially-qualified firms prepared to get involved. Financing 
options have also improved, with one-to-three-year arrangements generally available, but anything 
longer-term is accessible by only a small number of domestic firms. 
Japan
New regulation should have a positive impact, but currently Japan’s PPP regime lacks consistency. A 
tendency towards bid-rigging distorts the process, although financing is a strong point.
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 63.7 50.0 66.7 61.4 57.5 83.3 75.0
Rank 6 6 =4 6 4 4 =2
Since the 1999 Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative (PFI), Japan has had a national-level 
framework for PPP projects. This Act, however, presents basic principles, rather than offering detail of 
project-implementation or risk-allocation, for example. An amendment to the Act was approved in April 
2011 and is set to come into effect later in the year. It will have a major impact, as it provides greater 
scope for unsolicited proposals, widens the range of projects open to PPP, and will establish a new PFI 
Promotion Council. Under the current system, there are practical guidelines (implemented in 2001) that 
govern decision-making, risk-sharing, and VFM, as well as an expert-led PFI Committee, which delivers 
guidance on financial support for projects, and project appraisals. Despite this, individual ministries 
have actual day-to-day oversight of projects, and there is also a lack of systematisation, as 41 prefectures 
plan projects locally (73% of projects in 2007-08). Funding for projects is a strong point, with local banks 
providing both conventional financing and other options, such as project-financing, which can be very 
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lucrative for both major and regional banks. Long-term corporate bonds of up to 20-year maturities are 
also a common way of raising funds.
Most projects are delivered through competitive tender, and the Civil Code, Antimonopoly Law and 
the PFI Law support fair and competitive bidding. However, bid-rigging does take place, and it is rarely 
punished in an appropriate manner. Dispute-resolution is available through the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, or the courts, but neither is widely used owing to cumbersome 
procedures and a lack of resources. Judges are also likely to favour the government in disputes, with the 
PFI Committee itself recommending in 2007 the creation of a “neutral entity” for dispute resolution. As 
a general rule, PPP projects tend to be at the smaller end of the spectrum in Japan, although the project 
failure rate is relatively low.
Korea, Rep.
One of the region’s most advanced countries in terms of PPP. Processes are fair and transparent, and 
the PPP body has well-trained staff. Rotation among the civil service, however, is an issue.
Since 1999 the country has had “umbrella” PPP legislation via the Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Act (PPI Act). This was updated in 2005 to enable Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL) models, as 
well as projects in a wider variety of areas. All stages of the PPP process are overseen by the Ministry 
of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), with the Private Infrastructure Investment Management Centre 
(PIMAC) assisting in an advisory and guideline-drawing capacity. PIMAC has established consistently 
followed processes for VFM testing, proposal-preparation, tender-evaluation, and standard concession 
agreements. Any prospective project with a value of over W50bn (US$48m) is subject to preliminary 
review, with either PIMAC (in the case of unsolicited projects) or the relevant agency (solicited projects, 
later reviewed by PIMAC) conducting VFM tests. The bidding process is considered fair, and there are no 
single-bid contracts, as invitations are issued again if only one bidder emerges. Currently, there are no 
PPP-specific dispute-resolution mechanisms, but private mediation firms, as well as the Office of the 
Ombudsman may offer mediation. The MOSF has submitted a revision to the PPP act to create a Dispute-
Mediation Committee.
PIMAC staff comprises trained engineers, accountants, lawyers, and project finance experts. 
Unfortunately, however, MOSF staff are frequently rotated, and politicised hiring/firing is a problem; 
this may lead to a lack of consistency and knowledge. Regarding risk-sharing, the standard concession 
agreement sets out how this will be divided, with case-by-case variations. In the early days of the 
country’s PPP experience, the state was arguably too generous with minimum-revenue guarantees (MRG); 
the Incheon Airport Highway (1999) drew less than half the projected revenue, but the MRG meant that 
the government bore almost all the losses. Since 2005, however, MRGs have been phased out. Financial 
markets are relatively conducive to PPP financing, and, politically, both main parties support PPPs; 
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 71.3 78.1 75.0 68.8 54.2 88.9 50.0
Rank 3 3 3 4 5 3 =6
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Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 34.3 25.0 41.7 15.7 43.3 55.6 25.0
Rank 13 =13 =8 14 14 =9 =12
however, there is a political taboo against projects in the water industry (sewage is an exception). There 
are no energy projects, either. At a local level, there is some concern that smaller regional authorities lack 
the capacity to handle PPPs. 
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is going in the right direction, but concerns around the bidding process remain. The 
government, however, appears keen to promote PPP, as indicated by the new amendment to the PPP 
Law and interest around new projects. 
PPPs are legislated for under the Law of The Republic of Kazakhstan (2006, amended 2008), and can 
be implemented at a national or local level in the transport, energy, and water sectors—although local 
authorities typically lack the human resources and financial capability to make decisions. The law does 
have problems, such as not allowing concession facilities to be pledged as security; it is also the case that 
parties must rely on other laws, such as the Civil Code of Kazakhstan, where the Law itself does not cover a 
particular aspect of PPP. A new amendment, however, is expected in 2011. 
PPP policy, laws, and institutional arrangements are implemented at the national level, with the 
Commission for Concessions (which is chaired by the prime minister) choosing private partners and 
launching projects, and the Kazakhstan Centre for PPP evaluating the economic expediency of projects 
and their implementation (although oversight of projects in progress falls to the appropriate line 
ministry). Decision-making, however, is not systematic, and despite fair regulations on bidding, there are 
strong concerns about bias. Courts are also subject to bias, although PPP contracts do typically allow for 
international arbitration.
A presidential decree bans the PPP model from being applied to main railway lines, navigable 
waterways, and a number of other areas. Where projects are allowed, risk-allocation appears to be a 
problem. The Shar-Oskemen railway line project shows evidence of such difficulties, in which inflation 
and difficult terrain lead to cost-overrun, resulting in the operator defaulting on its bonds. Despite this, 
the government is keen to press on with PPP projects, and, as such, US$6bn worth of PPPs are planned 
for Kazakhstan by 2015, including the major Ak Bulak water programme, which will result in 15 separate 
projects. Financing is a relatively strong area, with the Development Bank of Kazakhstan providing 
some long-term funding for infrastructural development, in the form of 5-20 year mezzanine, bridge 
and working-capital financing. There are subsidies available for low-income users; for instance, the Law 
on Housing Relations provides for utility bill discounts, Presidential Decree 2247 (1995) legislates for 
discounts on water and electricity, and local authorities often offer reduced-fare public transport for 
children, the elderly, and students.
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Mongolia
Political weaknesses and a lack of specialist staff have given rise to less-than-ideal conditions for 
PPP projects. The Law on Concessions is based on international standards, but this only forms part of 
the regulatory framework.
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 38.8 34.4 33.3 41.8 43.0 38.9 50.0
Rank 12 10 =11 11 15 =13 =6
A Law on Concessions, based on international standards (albeit with some localised points), was 
enacted in March 2010. A resolution came into effect on July 2010 to establish tendering procedures, 
which will be overseen by a Tendering Committee. However, various other acts also form part of the 
legal framework for concessions, such as the Constitution, the Civil Code, and the Foreign Investment 
Law. There is no reference to risk-allocation, although there are provisions for compensation in case of 
changes in the law or economic circumstances. The new law provides a framework for PPP selection and 
decision-making, with Article 30 offering options on government support for concessionaires, such as 
loan guarantees and tax credits. There is some concern, however, that in practice PPP decision-making 
in Mongolia is weak; regarding previous PPP projects, there is little evidence of cost-benefit analysis or 
benchmarking having been used.
There is a dedicated PPP Unit that oversees projects and operates under the purview of the State 
Property Committee, and currently maintains a list of 29 projects. As a new organisation, it is still 
developing experience, and, owing to a lack of resources, is unable to hire many specialists; it is, however, 
receiving assistance from multilateral institutions. There is also concern over the below-market pricing of 
road transport, power, and water, which threatens the sustainability of PPPs in such areas. Furthermore, 
Mongolia had no experience of PPPs in the energy, transport, and water sectors over the past decade, 
although the private sector has stepped in with a number of Build-Own-Operate (BOO) transport projects 
implemented on the back of the resources sector. On a general level, Mongolia has a history of volatile 
politics and inefficient administration, which may even worsen as capital flows in as part of the nation’s 
commodities boom. Underdeveloped capital markets also mean that the possibility of long-term financing 
is severely limited.
Pakistan
Pakistan’s PPP environment is still evolving, and, despite government support, a stable, coherent 
system is still some way off. Political risk is also a major concern.
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 23.3 25.0 25.0 3.1 46.9 13.9 25.0
Rank 15 =13 =13 16 11 16 =12
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Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 20.8 15.6 25.0 6.3 17.7 38.9 25.0
Rank 16 16 =13 15 16 =13 =12
Pakistan’s PPP Law is currently awaiting ratification, and, as such, PPP projects will continue to 
be subject to other general and sector-specific laws. The policy framework being developed by the 
Infrastructure Project Development Facility (IPDF) is still a work-in-progress, and limited experience 
in areas such as risk-allocation mean that it will be difficult to live up to expectations. According to the 
PPP Policy (2010), conditions such as VFM and viability must be met when awarding projects, but it is 
generally acknowledged that there is a lack of consistency in the application of such criteria. Legally, 
the government must follow the Public Procurement Rules (2004) and treat bidders equally; however, 
according to the World Bank, only 50-75% of public-sector procurement contracts are awarded on the 
basis of open competition. A relatively small field of bidders also limits competition. Dispute-resolution 
usually takes place in court; the process is lengthy (although not unfavourable towards private partners), 
and an Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre was recently established. 
The IPDF acts as the PPP unit and supports a PPP Task Force (which advises on PPP reforms and 
legislation) chaired by the minister of finance; these, in combination with the Debt Policy Coordination 
Office and the project-specific line ministries, form the basis of the new institutional arrangement. This 
will take some time to gel, however, and for now, there are operational problems with regard to capacity. 
Pakistan is, of course, a politically troubled country, and depends on “external receipts” (that is, aid, 
principally from the US and tied to foreign policy objectives) to remain solvent, presenting a non-
payment risk. The availability of long-term infrastructure financing is also very limited, although short-
term financing is available from commercial banks. 
Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea is still in the early stages with regard to PPP. A new PPP centre and a PPP bill and 
regulations are due to come into effect, but it remains a country mostly lacking in even the most 
basic infrastructure.
Since 2008 there has been a PPP Taskforce, led by the Department of National Planning and 
Monitoring, and supported by multilateral agencies. A legal framework, consisting of a PPP bill and 
regulations, is expected to be submitted to parliament by the end of 2011. Guidelines for risk-allocation 
and control are to be issued by a PPP Centre, which is proposed as a statutory body with an advisory 
role, under the Treasury. Up to now, however, risk-allocation has been a problem, as evidenced by the 
performance of PNG Power. Currently, oversight of projects is diffused across sectors, and expertise on 
PPP is very limited. Likewise, as there is no umbrella framework, the PPP creation process is patchy and 
sector-specific. VFM testing is limited; most public organisations procure through non-public, established 
networks, and with no prospect of appeal. 
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Dispute-resolution is usually settled privately, although ADR is used in the energy sector. The courts 
are seen as relatively fair, and owing to the Investment Promotion Act, there is no legal discrimination 
against foreign firms. If the new PPP bill is passed, the overall environment for PPPs will be greatly 
improved; however, it is possible that it will fail, since the government bloc in parliament is composed 
of a coalition of many small parties. Attaining finance for projects in Papua New Guinea is also difficult, 
owing to underdeveloped financial markets. Infrastructure is generally very poor, with the majority of the 
population living in areas without even remotely adequate coverage. 
Philippines
The Philippines has a long history with PPP projects, and benefits from a good legal framework. 
However, there is some institutional weakness, and limitations on dispute-resolution and financing.
The Philippines has been utilising PPPs in the water sector since the late 1980s. The Republic Act 6957 
(BOT Law) exists to provide guidance for PPP infrastructure projects, and has also been extended to other 
sectors, in line with the Medium-term Philippine Development Plan. Since the law was amended in 1994, a 
variety of PPP models has been possible, and, in 1998, a revision was made on procurement requirements, 
and competitive-bidding processes were introduced. The overall legal framework is good, but there are 
no specific provisions for compensation; compensation is currently dealt with by the government on 
a case-by-case basis. Projects are selected first via the procuring government unit, which develops an 
implementation plan that is then evaluated and, if approved, incorporated into a relevant development 
plan by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). NEDA’s Investment Coordination 
Committee is responsible for evaluation and final approval of projects and now presides over the old BOT 
Centre (renamed the PPP Centre). The PPP Centre does have expert staff, but high turnover has detracted 
from its effectiveness.
The bidding process is well structured; in each case, the procuring agency must create a 
Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) composed of relevant experts, to invite, evaluate, 
and recommend bids. Dispute-resolution, however, is a weak point, with loopholes in rules leading to 
ambiguity; disputes are usually left to parties to solve between themselves, although arbitration and 
(occasionally) the courts are used. The courts themselves are not truly independent, although the 
situation is improving. 
The current administration is also keen to attract foreign PPP partners, offering use of guarantees in 
some circumstances (political opposition to this does exist, however). Generally, the government’s ability 
to support projects is limited, owing to its poor fiscal position; the bond market is also underdeveloped, 
reducing the possibility of finding adequate funding.
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 47.1 43.8 41.7 44.8 46.3 61.1 50.0
Rank 8 7 =8 10 13 8 =6
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Thailand
Political instability, and an unsystematic framework, in which it is not always clear which agency 
is in charge, create an atmosphere of uncertainty. New regulations, however, are likely to improve 
matters.
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 45.3 28.1 50.0 50.9 48.6 55.6 50.0
Rank 10 12 7 8 9 =9 =6
Since 1992 Thailand has had the Act of Private Participation in State Undertakings (PPSU), which 
offers a broad interpretation of PPP projects and extends to any relevant activity with a value of over 
Bt1bn (US$34m). The Act does not deal with risk-allocation, and does not prescribe what specific 
procurement methods can be used, or how the project should be selected. Risk-allocation in particular 
can be a problem, as seen in the case of the debt-workout required to complete the BTS/Skytrain project. 
Institutionally, power rests with several different agencies; however, the Ministry of Finance is now 
drafting a new PPP Law, which, it is hoped, will provide a clear framework for the implementation and 
operation of relevant projects. Before this comes into effect, decision-making will likely continue to be 
unsystematic, and the possibility of political instability does leave some room for doubt over whether the 
Law will be passed in any case. A PPP taskforce now exists, but there is as yet no central PPP agency. 
Competitive bidding is the only means by which a private-sector participant can be selected, and 
while the PPSU offers no guidance on this, guidelines issued in 2009 do the job well enough. The owner 
of the project must set up a committee consisting of representatives of the procuring ministry, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Office of the Attorney-General, and the Office of the National Economic and 
Social Development Board. In the case of disputes, a cabinet resolution (2009) specifies that any dispute 
involving the government would be resolved through the courts, not arbitration, representing a point of 
concern for foreign investors in particular. With regard to financing options, short-term loans with annual 
reviews and re-pricing are the norm. Large loans taken out under long-term fixed rates come via foreign 
banks. In general, the bond market in Thailand is dominated by the state, with the value of domestic 
corporate bonds standing at only Bt1.3bn (US$44m). 
UK
The UK offers highly sophisticated processes for the selection and management of PPP projects, a 
result of its deep experience in the field. 
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 89.7 96.9 100.0 76.7 82.3 94.4 75.0
Rank 2 2 =1 2 2 =1 =2
Under national law, the central government may enter into any PPP contract it wishes, unless 
otherwise restricted by an Act of Parliament; therefore, no separate PPP legislation is required at this 
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level. On a local level, there exists a Local Government (Contracts) Act (1997), permitting transport, 
waste, and energy PPP contracts. Under HM Treasury, the body Infrastructure UK has a PPP Policy Team, 
which contributes to policy, guidance and data collation, and provides advice for those undertaking 
projects. Devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland means that each individual country has 
different powers to enact legislation on PPPs, however. Administrative guidance is strong; HM Treasury, 
for instance, has issued VFM guidance, which must be followed in all projects. Clear guidelines for risk-
allocation exist, as set out in the Standardisation of PFI Contracts (SoPC Version 4, 2007), a document 
that also sets out the compensation system in the case of unforeseen difficulties.
Bidding is open and fair, and usually conducted via a “competitive dialogue” process; the winner 
is the bidder adjudged to offer the most economically advantageous proposal, rather than simply the 
cheapest, in accordance with the Public Contracts Regulations (2006). Disputes are resolved either 
through direct consultation between the parties, or through the judgment of an expert; if these prove 
unsatisfactory, arbitration or the courts (which are impartial and efficient) can be used. Domestic firms 
are not favoured over foreign, and there has been no instance of expropriation of foreign assets. Finance 
is readily available, with all major banks providing structured finance for PPP projects, and a sophisticated 
debt market enables the issuance of bonds in both sterling and foreign currencies. Finally, although 
around 80% of projects are run at a local level, there is some variation between areas in capacity for 
implementation. But overall, there is a deep pool of expert consultants, enabling effective management 
of projects.
Vietnam
The government shows strong interest in developing PPP projects, as evidenced by a new pilot decree. 
Yet there is a general lack of experience as regards PPPs, and an underdeveloped regulatory and 
institutional framework.   
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 26.3 18.8 16.7 25.5 46.4 33.3 25.0
Rank 14 15 16 13 12 15 =12
Vietnam has limited experience with infrastructure PPPs. A 2006 BOT Law (Decree 108) was on January 
15th 2011 superseded by a specific prime ministerial PPP decree. This was a pilot ruling and was intended 
to be replaced by new PPP guidelines or a full PPP law in 3-5 years, building upon the experience and 
lessons of implementing the pilot scheme. Until now, only two “true” PPP projects have been created, the 
Phu My 2-2 and Phu My 3 energy plants, through a bulk off-take agreement with Electricity of Vietnam 
(EVN). Most deals have been between state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the state, such as the Hanoi-
Haiphong Expressway. According to the new decree, the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) will 
oversee the feasibility evaluation and implementation of projects, aided by “authorised state agencies”, 
such as government ministries and People’s Committees. There is to be no specific PPP body, although an 
inter-ministerial PPP task force has been created. 
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Although there has recently been a strong expression of political support for the development of PPP 
projects, a lack of provision for risk-allocation in the new decree and weak mechanisms for arbitration 
for dispute resolution may be causes for concern, as the development and implementation of water, 
transport and energy PPP projects begins in earnest. While the decree upholds the contractual rights of 
parties, legislative change and the use of force majeure often over-ride such rights in Vietnam. Since the 
new decree came into effect, there have been no bids solicited. Furthermore, financing is an issue; while 
the underdeveloped capital market also limits opportunities for long-term infrastructure financing. In 
2001 the MPI, in conjunction with the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the municipal governments of 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, was working on a list of 24 potential PPP projects for development.
Gujarat State
Arguably the best destination in India for PPP projects, Gujarat State has a well-structured system 
in place. The Gujarat Infrastructure Development Board (GIDB) oversees projects and provides a 
relatively high standard of expertise and judgment.
Overall index
Regulatory 
framework
Institutional 
framework
Operational 
maturity
Investment 
climate
Financial 
facilities
Sub-national 
adjustment
Score 67.6 65.6 66.7 61.1 80.0 77.8 50.0
Rank 4 4 =4 7 3 5 =6
Gujarat is one of India’s most advanced states in terms of PPP, with the Gujarat Infrastructure 
Development Act (GID Act) (1999) setting a comprehensive framework for a variety of projects, awarded 
through competitive bidding. The Act also makes it clear that oversight is the responsibility of the GIDB, 
providing clarity that the national framework does not. Risk-sharing is achieved through the use of Model 
Concession Agreements, with the GID Act providing for compensation for private partners where deemed 
appropriate. Disputes are handled under the Gujarat Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal 
Act (1992), with either amicable conciliation or arbitration (ADR) used. 
Institutionally, Gujarat has a strong system, with a clear delineation of responsibilities between 
the GIDB, and the line departments of procuring government agencies. The technical expertise of 
GIDB staff is also adjudged to be high. The GIDB provides a fair and clear mechanism for the selection 
of concessionaires, and, in practice, this system typically works well. There have, however, been 
exceptions—for instance, in the introduction of solar power PPPs. Problems exist with the judicial system, 
with delays in the process, as well as bureaucracy, being causes for concern. In terms of financing, 
Gujarat is in a strong position, having emerged as a top investment destination in India; the government 
is also fiscally credible, meaning that payment risk is considered very low. The Gujarat State Guarantee 
Redemption Fund (initiated in 2010) acts as a cushion for contingent liabilities arising out of state 
guarantees.
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Appendix 2: Calculating the index
Indicator scores are normalised and then aggregated across categories to enable a comparison of broader 
concepts across countries. Normalisation rebases the raw indicator data to a common unit so that it can 
be aggregated.
The indicators of quantitative data where a higher value indicates greater experience with projects, a 
better business climate or better political environment have been normalised on the basis of:
x = (x - Min(x)) / (Max(x) - Min(x))
where Min(x) and Max(x) are, respectively, the lowest and highest values across the countries/index 
for any given indicator. The normalised value is then transformed from a 0-1 value to a 0-100 score 
to make it directly comparable with other indicators. This effectively means that the country with the 
highest raw data value will score 100, while the lowest will score 0.
Modelling and weighting the indicators and categories in the index results in scores of 0-100 for each 
country, where 100 represents the highest quality and performance, and 0 the lowest. The countries 
assessed can then be ranked according to these indices.
Qualitative data
All qualitative indicators have been scored on an integer scale. This scale ranges are 0-4 or 0-3; scores are 
assigned by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s research team according to the scoring criteria. The integer 
scores are then transformed to a 0-100 score to make them comparable with the quantitative indicators in 
the index. 
Weighting the index
At the conclusion of the concession readiness research exercise, we selected a series of default weightings 
deemed appropriate for the overall index calculation. These weightings are not meant to represent a final 
judgment on relative indicator importance. These may be changed by users at will. 
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Appendix 3: Detailed indicator descriptions
Legal and regulatory framework
1.1) Consistency and quality of PPP regulations: Do PPP policy frameworks and laws establish an 
effective and efficient process for PPP project-creation across sectors? Do regulations establish clear 
requirements and oversight mechanisms (for example, which government institutions are responsible for 
project-implementation, project-preparation, bidding, contract awards, construction and operation)? 
Does the policy framework provide guidelines for proper risk allocation across parties? Is there a clear 
system for compensating the private sector for acts of authority that change sector-specific economic 
conditions not foreseen during bidding? Also considers if regulations avoid open-ended compensation 
rights for private participants, so that the state only assumes explicitly written commercial contractual 
contingent liabilities.
Scoring
0= The legal framework is so cumbersome or restrictive that in practice national-level PPPs are extremely 
difficult to implement; 
1= The legal framework allows national-level PPPs, but it is ill-defined and risk-allocation and 
compensation are unclear and inefficient; 
2= The legal framework allows national-level concessions and also establishes general, open-ended 
oversight, risk-allocation and compensation rules; 
3= The legal framework is generally good and coherent, addressing risk-allocation issues, while leaving 
some ambiguity with regard to compensation schemes and project-implementation; 
4= The legal framework is comprehensive and consistent across sectors and layers of government, 
addresses risk-allocation and compensation issues according to strict economic principles and enables 
sophisticated and consistent oversight of project-implementation.
1.2) Effective PPP selection and decision-making: “Do regulations establish efficient planning 
frameworks so that evaluations and decisions regarding PPP project-creation and planning are 
systematic? Do they establish proper accounting of contingent liabilities, so that there is a clear 
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process for deciding on the type and extent of government financial support? Do regulators regularly 
apply appropriate project-evaluation and cost-benefit analysis techniques to ensure that a PPP is the 
optimal project-financing and service-provision option? Does the Budget Office systematically measure 
contingent contractual liabilities and account for delayed investment payments in a way consistent with 
public investment accounting?” In this indicator, we also look at past experiences and frameworks to 
handle unsolicited private-sector bids.
Scoring
0= Decision-making processes are not defined–they are erratic and subject to change, without accounting 
for liabilities; 
1= Decision-making processes are defined, but are only occasionally followed, and accounting for 
liabilities is not well established; 
2= Decision-making processes are defined and upheld, but accounting practices are not adequate; 
3= Proper decision-making is both defined and used for PPP project decisions, although accounting for 
liabilities should be improved for more consistent decisions; 
4= PPP project-selection is a consistent result of various efficiency, cost-benefit and social-evaluation 
considerations required by law and accompanied by rigorous accounting practices.
Note on unsolicited bids:
The rationale behind unsolicited bids is to let the private sector innovate and come up with ideas for PPPs. 
The bidder who innovates could get an additional 5% to 10% in the bidding process. However, allowing 
the private sector to replace brainstorm/planning efforts usually made by the government for project 
preparation can add additional costs and bias. Nor do private-sector initiatives resolve the problem of a 
lack of human capital in government, as the government still has to review the projects. When evaluating 
the processes and quality of unsolicited bidding, it is necessary to make sure these types of bids are purely 
to help provide new project ideas, without replacing the role of government investment and planning.
1.3) Fairness/openness of bids, contract changes: “Do regulations unfairly favour certain project 
bidders and operators? Do regulations require and establish competitive bidding, that is, the, use of 
objective criteria and transparency during the selection process, requiring review of the impartiality of 
costs and the publishing of necessary bidding documents, and a clear, consistent process for contract 
and contract-adjustment negotiations? (The need for transparency, cost-review and a consistent process 
applies to single bids.) Do regulations require bidding for any significant, additional work necessary? Is 
a system established for independent oversight of such renegotiation procedures and conditions (in the 
event that separate bids are not required)?”
Scoring
0= Regulations unfairly favour certain bidders over others, transparency requirements are not in place 
and contracts are changed in a discretionary manner; 
1= Regulations introduce some bias towards particular parties, and bidding, transparency and 
renegotiation schemes are poor; 
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2= Project-bidding is fair and transparent, but renegotiations and expansions are regulated poorly; 
3= Regulations generally define a fair playing field, with considerations for contract-expansion, 
renegotiation and adjustments; 
4= Regulations establish fair and transparent bidding procedures, set limits to renegotiations and 
adjustments and require independent oversight of post-award procedures.
Note on single-source bidding:
Single-source bidding, although at a superficial level inherently less competitive than multiple-source 
bidding, is sometimes the most realistic process in countries with capacity limitations, where it may be 
difficult to find many bidders who are qualified.
The appropriateness, transparency and fairness of single-bidding processes have been evaluated, with 
the assumption that the results and rationale behind its use are the most important criteria for scoring. 
1.4) Dispute-resolution mechanisms: “Are there fair and transparent dispute-resolution mechanisms 
for quickly resolving controversies between the state and the operator, and at low cost? Are there options 
for technically adequate and efficient conciliation schemes, to address complex project-design and 
planning issues (for example, engineering, architectural quality, land acquisition, procurement disputes, 
environmental impact issues), without lengthy appeals?”
Scoring
0= Dispute-resolution systems for PPPs are undefined and insufficient; 
1= Dispute-resolution mechanisms operate, but these are not transparent or efficient; 
2= Adequate dispute-resolution mechanisms operate, but arbitration and appeals are lengthy and 
complex; 
3= Comprehensive, effective dispute-resolution mechanisms operate, incorporating necessary technical 
considerations; 
4= Effective and efficient dispute-resolution mechanisms establish independent arbitration according 
to law and contracts, without lengthy appeals and with accompanying viable prejudicial reconciliation 
options.
Institutional framework 
2.1) Quality of institutional design: This indicator evaluates the existence and role of various agencies 
necessary for PPP oversight and planning, such as a PPP board at ministerial level, a State Contracting 
Agency, a PPP Advisory Agency and a Regulatory Agency for enforcement of project standards. It also 
considers involvement of government budget and planning offices.
Scoring
0= PPP-specific agencies do not operate and relevant institutions lack accountability and independence 
from rent seekers; 
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1= Some agencies operate, but oversight is not comprehensive and agencies are highly prone to political 
distortion; 
2= Agencies operate and are fairly technical in nature, but do not play all necessary roles; 
3= The necessary agencies operate and generally fulfil all necessary roles for sector oversight, although 
their structure and roles could be improved; 
4= The institutional design ensures satisfactory oversight and planning agencies, incorporating checks 
and balances for effective planning, regulation and accountability.
2.2) PPP contract and hold-up risk: “Does the judiciary enforce property rights and arbitration 
rulings? Does the judiciary uphold contracts related to cost-recovery? Can investors appeal against 
rulings by regulators, expedite contract transfer for project exit and obtain fair compensation for 
early termination?” Also considers whether the state has an expedite mechanism for replacing failed 
operators, to protect creditors’ rights.
Scoring
0= The judiciary poorly enforces PPP operator and investor rights and arbitration rulings, and there is no 
effective appeals process; 
1= The judiciary occasionally upholds PPP operator and investor rights and arbitration rulings, but in an 
inefficient manner; 
2= The judiciary usually upholds contracts, PPP operator and investor rights and arbitration rulings, but 
hold-ups are common; 
3= The judiciary consistently and effectively upholds contracts and allows for appeals to regulator rulings, 
ensures fair compensation for early termination and transfer of contracts, although delays occur and can 
generate hold-up risk; 
4= The judiciary effectively enforces PPP operator and investor rights and arbitration rulings, allowing 
for expedited contract transfers and ensuring that early termination occurs only in exceptional public-
interest circumstances, with fair compensation to the operator and protection to creditors.
Operational maturity
3.1) Public capacity to plan and oversee PPPs: “Are public capabilities for planning, design/
engineering, environmental assessment, and oversight of project service standards robust? And do 
government officials have technical expertise in project-financing, risk-evaluation and contract design? 
Do financial authorities employ proper accounting practices when considering fiscal and contingent 
liabilities? Do they have a reputation for designing contracts that reduce post-bid opportunism?” 
Scoring: It is seen as positive if consultants and training are used, but not as a crutch or substitute for a 
lack of public-sector capacity. 
0= Agencies do not have any of the necessary expertise or experience; 
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1= Agencies have very limited project expertise and experience; 
2= Agencies have some project planning, design and financing expertise or experience and oversee 
service quality to a limited extent; 
3= Agencies generally have the necessary comprehensive project planning, design and financing 
expertise and experience, exhibiting moderate service-quality oversight capacity; 
4= Agencies have the necessary expertise and experience and effectively regulate the sector on a 
consistent basis.
3.2) Methods and criteria for awarding projects: “What is the track record of PPP agencies for using 
competitive bidding and objective economic factors as the primary consideration in final project-
selection and contract awards (for example, qualitative assessments regarding quality and soundness of 
the project and quantitative tools, such as VFM and public comparators)? Are incentive-efficient schemes 
used for allocating projects (for example, in toll-road projects, using net present value of revenue with 
contract periods of variable length)?”
Scoring
0= The granting agency awards projects based on subjective considerations and does not systematically 
use objective, economic variables; 
1= The granting agency has a poor track record, but does consider economic factors with some limits to 
discretion; 
2= The regulator considers economic criteria to award projects, although these are not always the most 
efficient and appropriate ones, and subjective factors still play an important role; 
3= The regulator has a good track record that could be improved (that is, it uses economic variables, but 
does not give these priority over other factors); 
4= The regulator has an excellent track record and systematically uses economic criteria in an effective, 
transparent and consistent manner. 
3.3) Regulators’ risk-allocation record: “Has the allocation of risk between the state and private sector 
been successful in recent years, so as to ensure VFM, reduce excessive contract-renegotiations and reduce 
the likelihood of project defaults or bail-outs? How effective has the use of guarantees and performance 
bonds for project risk-diversification been?”
Scoring
0= Risk-allocation is often handled inappropriately, and excessive, unnecessary renegotiations are 
common or likely; 
1= Risk has been allocated properly only occasionally, as evidenced by a high incidence of contract-
renegotiation, and hedging and insurance instruments have been used only minimally; 
2= Risk is usually distributed fairly between the state and the operator, but renegotiations are still 
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common and financial instruments, such as insurance, guarantees and performance bonds, are 
occasionally used; 
3= Risk has been fairly distributed, renegotiations have been moderate and parties employ some financial 
risk-hedging practices; 
4= Risk has been consistently allocated correctly between the state and the private sector to minimise 
unnecessary renegotiations, with extensive and effective use of financial instruments.
3.4) Experience in electricity, transport and water projects: This indicator shows the number of 
transport, water and electricity concession projects in the past ten years (2000-09) in each country, as 
recorded by the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database. Scoring is conducted 
on the basis of raw data, where a higher number of projects is better.
Note on scoring: 
This score is created directly by raw data; more projects indicate more experience. Projects are counted 
in the World Bank PPI database if: investment commitments exceed US$1m; private sponsors/consortia 
own at least 25% of the PPI contract; the project reached financial closure between 2000 and 2009; and 
projects provide a significant share of services (at least 20% of sales or installed capacity) to the public, 
directly or indirectly.
Serving the public directly involves projects with a retail component, such as electricity or water-
distribution. Qualifying transport facilities are those open for public use, such as airports, railways, 
roads, or seaports. Indirect services include stand-alone bulk facilities (excluding. power or water-
treatment plants) that sell their output to a third party for distribution to the general public; 
transmission facilities that provide transport services between bulk and retail facilities; or railways and 
seaports that provide services to companies. Figures do not include projects serving a small number of 
clients on an exclusive basis (definition cited directly from PPI database website).
3.5) Quality of electricity, transport and water projects: This indicator shows the distress/failure rate 
of power, transport and water concessions and greenfield projects over the past ten years (2000-09). 
Please note that countries with fewer than five projects in the transport and water sectors are scored more 
critically than those with five or more (see scoring guide below for details).
Scoring
0= For countries with five or more projects in the PPI database, this indicates a project failure/distress 
rate above 20%. For countries with fewer than five projects, this indicates a failure/distress rate of 25% or 
above; 
1= For countries with five or more projects in the PPI database, this indicates a project failure/distress 
rate between 14% and 20%. For countries with fewer than five water and transport projects, this indicates 
a 0% failure/distress rate;
2= Failure/distress rate between 8% and 14%; 
3= Failure/distress rate between 3% and 8%; 
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4= Failure/distress rate between 0% and 3%.
Investment climate 
4.1) Political distortion: Evaluates the level of political distortion affecting the country’s private sector. 
Each country’s score is a weighted average of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s political stability and 
government policy effectiveness risk scores, and the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
index. Possible scores range from 0 to 100, where 0=worst and 100=best.
4.2) Business environment: Evaluates the quality of the general business environment for infrastructure 
projects. Each country’s score is a weighted average of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s market 
opportunities and macroeconomic risk scores, and the goods and market efficiency ranking of the World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index. Possible scores range from 0 to 100, where 0=worst and 
100=best.
4.3) Political will: This indicator evaluates the level of political consensus, or will, to engage private 
parties in concessions (PPPs) and to provide favourable implementation frameworks across the water/
sanitation, electricity and transport sectors.
Scoring
0= The government has consistently expressed a lack of interest or inconsistent intentions in engaging 
private participation through concessions or improving frameworks. Conditions for private investment 
are hostile; 
1= The government has shown some reluctance to engage private participation through concessions 
(PPPs) and provide favourable frameworks, either because of disagreement among or explicit opposition 
from significant political groupings; 
2= There is political consensus surrounding the need to engage private participation through concessions 
(PPPs) and provide favourable frameworks, although implementation is slow; 3= There is political 
consensus to maintain favourable frameworks and to be pro-active with concession projects, where 
appropriate, and the likelihood of major political delays is low.
Financial facilities 
5.1) Government payment risk: “Does the government regularly fulfil obligations for PPP contracts or 
use liquidity-guarantee schemes to reduce non-payment risk?” Also considers the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s sovereign debt risk ratings and whether countries have had active partnerships with the World 
Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee agency during the past five years to insure electricity, transport 
or water projects.
Scoring
0= The government struggles to fulfil obligations to concessionaires; 
1= The government occasionally fulfils obligations; 
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2= The government usually fulfils obligations; 
3= The government usually fulfils obligations, and provides some minimal guarantees to investors; 
4=The government has an excellent track record of fulfilling obligations, and provides strong guarantees 
to investors.
Please note: In certain cases where project- or sector-specific information was not obtainable, scoring 
considers Economist Intelligence Unit sovereign credit risk ratings. For these instances, scoring employs 
the following guidelines: 0 = rating of CCC and below; 1= B rating; 2= BB rating; 3 = BBB and A rating; and 
4 = AA or AAA rating.
5.2) Capital market for private infrastructure finance: “How readily available and reliable are long-term 
debt instruments for infrastructure financing? Is there a developed insurance and pension market with 
useful products for infrastructure risk-reduction? Are interest-rate, exchange-rate hedging instruments 
available?”
Scoring
0= The markets for finance and risk instruments are underdeveloped or non-existent, and only foreign 
sources provide project-funding; 
1= The market for local finance is slowly developing, although most finance comes from international 
sources and risk-hedging instruments that are not robust; 
2= Some finance and risk instruments exist, although financing still mainly comes from foreign and 
multilateral organisations; 
3=The domestic market presents a large, reliable financing market, but risk instruments are still 
developing in size and complexity; 
4= There is a deep, liquid finance market locally, as well as a reliable and large local market for hedging 
instruments.
5.3) Marketable debt: “Is there a liquid, deep local-currency-denominated, fixed-rate, medium-term 
(five yrs +) bond market in marketable debt (that is, debt that is traded freely)?”
Scoring
0= There is no securities market for fixed-rate financing of over one year; 
1= There is a government securities market in place, but for short maturities only; 
2= The government is fostering a medium-term market and it should be in place soon; 
3= There is a medium-term (five yrs +) debt market, but only for public-sector (government bond) issuers; 
4= There is a medium-term (five yrs +) debt market for both public- and private-sector issuers.
5.4) Government support and affordability for low-income users: “Does the government provide 
subsidies that allow low-income users better access to electricity, water and transport services?”
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Scoring: Please note that, currently, the index considers a targeted, direct subsidy to be the preferable 
form of government support for low-income users. Cross-subsidy is second best.
0= The government does not subsidise the electricity, water or transport sectors, or has done so in an 
extremely distorting manner; 
1= The government does not subsidise the electricity, water or transport sectors, or has done so in a 
moderately distorting manner; 
2= The government occasionally provides subsidies for improved access for the poor in electricity, water 
or transport, but these are infrequent or applied only in certain cases; 
3= The government usually provides satisfactory subsidies for low-income users, but this can vary by 
sector and project; 
4= Subsidies are common, reliable and effectively target low-income users.
Sub-national adjustment 
6.1) Sub-national adjustment factor: This indicator evaluates whether infrastructure concessions can 
be carried out at a regional, state or municipal level, and the relative success and consistency of these 
frameworks.
Scoring
0= The legal framework does not allow regional or municipal entities to concession public works, or in 
practice the requirements are extremely cumbersome; 
1= The legal framework allows regional and municipal entities to concession public works, but technical 
capacity or political will is lacking; 
2= A few successful examples of regional or municipal concessions exist, but capacity and projects at this 
level across the country are generally weak; 
3= A significant concessions programme has been developed at a municipal or regional level, with good 
implementation-capacity and institutional design; 
4= An important and diverse (in terms of sectors and locations) concession programme has been 
developed at the municipal or regional level, and it benefits from a homogeneous framework, good local 
implementation-capacity and institutional design.
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Appendix 4: Methodology and sources
Methodology
The methodology for this benchmarking study was created by the Economist Intelligence Unit research 
team for the 2009 Infrascope for Latin America and the Caribbean, which was devised in consultation 
with the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF, a member of the Inter-American Development Bank Group), 
the World Bank Institute, the Asian Development Bank Institute (under the Multilateral Public-Private 
Partnership for Infrastructure Capacity Building (MP3IC) Initiative), regional sector experts of global 
PPP-implementing agencies and a wider group of sector stakeholders. Final editorial control for the index 
remained with the Economist Intelligence Unit. This indicator list was again revised in early 2010 after 
extensive peer review, with an eye to maintaining consistency across years, while increasing index rigour, 
relevance and global applicability. To ensure global comparability, the framework has been applied to 
the Asia-Pacific region. Drawing upon the peer-review meeting, and in collaboration with regional and 
independent country specialists, adjustments were made to capture distinctive features of the legal 
environment and various practices in the region.
The Economist Intelligence Unit research team gathered data for the index from the following sources:
• Interviews and/or questionnaires from sector experts, consultants and government officials, including 
Asian Development Bank officers 
• Legal and regulatory texts
• Economist Intelligence Unit country risk ratings and country reports
• Scholarly studies
• Websites of government authorities 
• Local and international news media reports
• Asian Development Bank documentation and country reports 
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• The World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database
• The World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency project database
• Transparency International
• World Economic Forum
Qualitative scores were assigned to each country for each indicator, based on an assessment of 
relevant information from three main sources: legal and regulatory texts; interviews and questionnaires; 
and infrastructure rankings. Secondary reports were also referenced on a country-specific basis. For the 
financial facilities category, a number of sources were considered, including the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s sovereign debt risk ratings, marketable debt risk ratings, and Country Finance and Country 
Commerce reports.
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Concept definitions
In this study, PPP refers specifically to projects that involve a long-term contract between a public-sector 
body and a private-sector entity for the design, construction (or upgrading), operation and maintenance 
of public infrastructure. Finance is usually provided by, and significant construction, operation and 
maintenance risks are transferred to, the private-sector entity, which also bears either availability or 
demand risk. However, the public-sector body remains responsible for policy oversight and regulation; 
and the infrastructure generally reverts to public-sector control at the end of the contract term. 
Acts of authority: unilateral actions by the government to change the economic specifications and 
terms of a contract.
Collusion risk: the risk that private-sector bidders or operators will create agreements among 
themselves that do not benefit the sustainability of a project or the government-financing portion.
Concessionaire: holder of a concession, where a private firm obtains the right from government to 
provide a service. 
Contingent liabilities: a potential liability on the balance sheet which is dependent on the outcome of 
future events. 
Economic criteria: criteria for selecting PPP projects based on economic factors, such as the net 
present value of a project’s revenue, the amount of subsidies requested by bidders or payments offered. 
Equity arbitration: a more informal arbitration regime, where parties attempt to resolve disputes 
based on fairness and equity considerations, rather than using a strict application of the law. 
Financial or economic equilibrium: an equation that relates costs, revenue and return on investment 
for private-sector participants. The equilibrium principle is specified in project contracts and makes 
important assumptions about demand levels, proper service levels, a project’s financial stability 
(including transfer payments to the government) and project investment costs.
Public comparator: a method of evaluating PPP projects where the costs of contracting infrastructure 
projects through full public provision and financing are used as a benchmark to assess the VFM benefits 
offered by PPP alternatives. 
Risk allocation: distribution of proportional risk to parties in a contract.  
Single-source bidding: contract awarded by way of soliciting and negotiating with one entity. Also 
known as sole-source bidding. 
Swiss Challenge: a process by which third parties are invited to match or exceed the offer made by the 
original proponent of an unsolicited proposal. 
Technical criteria: criteria for selecting PPP projects based on engineering, architectural design and 
technological aspects.
Unsolicited proposals: a proposal submitted to a procuring agency on the initiative of the proponent, 
and not in response to any formal or informal request for proposals or quotations. 
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Value for money (VFM) analysis: an analysis that compares the benefits of contracting infrastructure 
projects through PPP with the benefits of traditional public-sector procurement and investment. 
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